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作者：Krishna, Aradhna; Wang, Yu
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：In this paper, we show that there is a relationship between two important matching mechanisms: the Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC mechanism proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) and the Top Trading Cycles and Chains mechanism (TTCC mechanism proposed by Roth, Sonmez, and Unver, 2004). Our main result is that when a specific chain selection rule proposed by Roth et al. is used, these two mechanisms are equivalent. While the equivalence is relevant for one specific case of the TTCC mec...
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作者：Chu, Leon Yang; Sappington, David E. M.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of Southern California
摘要：Laffont and Tirole's [Using cost observation to regulate firms, J. Polit. Econ. 94 (1986) 614-641] pioneering analysis identifies the optimal procurement contract when the supplier can readily inflate his innate production cost without detection. When the buyer has some ability to limit such cost inflation, an alternative contract can outperform the contract identified by Laffont and Tirole. The alternative contract induces substantial pooling, discontinuous production costs and effort supply,...
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作者：De Lara, Michel; Gilotte, Laurent
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Universite Paris Saclay; AgroParisTech; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：This paper deals with the existence of a nonconcavity in the value of information, as was first explained by Radner and Stiglitz [A nonconcavity in the value of information, in: M. Boyer, R.E. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1984, pp. 33-52 (Chapter 3)]. After defining infinitesimal information distance variation IIDV, we find that IIDV = 0 is sufficient for a zero marginal value of information at the null. This is a condition only ...
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作者：Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjoestroem, Tomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations, and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information. Untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection. The severity of this problem depends on the outside option of entrepreneurs, which is working for wages. This links credit, product and labor markets. A rise in wages reduces the adverse selection problem. These multimarket interactions amplify product...
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作者：Mookherjee, Dilip; Napel, Stefan
作者单位：Boston University; University of Hamburg
摘要：A large literature on 'endogenous inequality' has argued that persistent differences in macroeconomic performance across countries can be explained by historical inequality, owing to indivisibilities in occupational choice and borrowing constraints. These models are characterized by homogenous agents, a continuum of steady states (SSs) and lack of mobility in every SS. We show that introducing (even a little) heterogeneity in order to generate SS mobility shrinks the SS set dramatically. Mobil...
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作者：Cozzi, Guido; Giordani, Paolo E.; Zamparelli, Luca
作者单位：Sapienza University Rome; University of Macerata; European University Institute; The New School
摘要：We provide a refoundation of the symmetric growth equilibrium characterizing the research sector of vertical R&D-driven growth models. We argue that the usual assumptions made in this class of models leave the agents indifferent as to where targeting research: hence, the problem of the allocation of R&D investment across sectors is indeterminate. By introducing an ,-contamination of confidence in the expected distribution of R&D investment, we prove that the symmetric structure of R&D investme...
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作者：Hansen, Lars Peter; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：In a Markov decision problem with hidden state variables, a posterior distribution serves as a state variable and Bayes' law under an approximating model gives its law of motion. A decision maker expresses fear that his model is misspecified by surrounding it with a set of alternatives that are nearby when measured by their expected log likelihood ratios (entropies). Martingales represent alternative models. A decision maker constructs a sequence of robust decision rules by pretending that a s...
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作者：Camargo, Braz
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This note provides a characterization of optimal policies in a class of two-armed bandits that allows for correlated arms. This characterization extends previously known results in the literature. In particular, it implies, under a mild continuity assumption, the optimality of cutoff belief strategies for this class of bandits. Cutoff beliefs are not unique, though. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Green, Jerry R.; Stokey, Nancy L.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago
摘要：We consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities. One player is specialized in gathering information and transmitting it to the other, who takes the decision. This process is modeled as a game. Qualitative properties of the equilibria are analyzed. The impact of improving the quality of available information on the equilibrium welfares of the two individuals is studied. Better information ge...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We demonstrate that auctioning market licenses may result in higher market prices than assigning them via more random allocation mechanisms. When future market profit is uncertain, winning an auction is like winning a lottery ticket. If firms differ in risk attitudes, auctions select the least risk-averse firm, which, in turn, set a higher price (or a higher quantity, in case quantity is the decision variable) in the marketplace than an average firm. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
