Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambec, Stefan
• 署名单位: Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); INRAE
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 733-744
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; Principal-agent; implementation; contract theory

摘要

This paper examines an informed principal-agent game with ex post participation constraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not lose by communicating in turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first. It then considers every Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules that assign non-negative payoffs for one player in a bilateral asymmetric information framework. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for sequential communication to be as efficient as simultaneous communication in implementing these allocation rules when the player with unbounded payoffs moves first. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.