Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans; Storcken, Ton
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 533-544
• 关键词: anonymity; voting; minimal manipulability

摘要

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.