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作者：Amelkin, Victor; Venkatesh, Santosh; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：Amazon.com; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Diversified cross -shareholding networks are thought to be more resilient to shocks, but diversification also increases the channels by which a shock can spread. To resolve these competing intuitions we introduce a stochastic model of a diversified cross -shareholding network in which a firm's valuation depends on its cash endowment and the shares it owns in other firms. We show that a concentration of measure phenomenon emerges: almost all realized network instances drawn from any probability...
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作者：Feng, Xin; Jiao, Qian; Kuang, Zhonghong; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：Nanjing University; Sun Yat Sen University; Renmin University of China; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper studies the effort-maximizing design of a team contest with an arbitrary number (odd or even) of pairwise battles. In a setting with full heterogeneity across players and battles, the organizer determines the prize allocation rule (or the winning rule of an indivisible prize) contingent on battle outcomes. We propose a measure of team's strength, which plays a crucial role in prize design. The optimal design is a majority-score rule with a headstart score granted to the weaker team:...
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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil; Mishra, Debasis
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism- design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. We derive three new results for the identical-objects model: (i) a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms, (ii) a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministi...
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作者：Schetter, Ulrich; Schneider, Maik T.; Jaeggi, Adrian
作者单位：University of Pavia; University of Graz; University of St Gallen
摘要：We examine how inequality and openness interact in shaping the long-run growth prospects of developing countries. To this end, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous households and non-homothetic preferences for quality. We show that inequality affects growth very differently in an open economy as opposed to a closed economy: If the economy is close to the technological frontier, the positive demand effect of inequality on growth found in closed-economy models may be amplif...
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作者：He, Chao; Fan, Xiaodong
作者单位：Liaoning University; Monash University
摘要：In standard labor search and matching models, the search intensity (SI) of unemployed workers is procyclical and complements job creation. Both predictions are at odds with the US labor market following the Great Recession. To address these inconsistencies, this paper extends the standard model to incorporate multi-market simultaneous search (MMSS). Adverse aggregate shocks can raise SI as workers simultaneously search in more markets because the incentives are decreasing in the local job-find...
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作者：Mandler, Michael
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：Increasing returns are inherent in information: the number of events that can be distinguished is an exponential function of the number of partitions applied to a state space. Just as factories should run at a large scale in the face of increasing returns, each partition should be coarse to allow the number of partitions to be large. This principle also holds for partitions, or equivalently questions, that are applied sequentially. When agents need to process all the answers to a question, 3-a...
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作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Taylor, Curtis R.
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Duke University
摘要：We study the dynamics of fraud and trust in a continuous -time reputation game. The principal wishes to approve a real project and reject a fake. The agent is either an ethical type that produces a real project, or a strategic type that also can produce a fake. Producing a real project takes an uncertain amount of time, while a fake can be created instantaneously at some cost. The unique equilibrium features an initial phase of doubt, during which the strategic agent randomly fakes and the pri...
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作者：Okat, Deniz; Nash, John G. F.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：A principal delegates a problem to an agent. The agent solves the problem by conducting independent trials. Each trial is privately costly and produces the solution with some probability. The principal relies on the agent to report the solution before realizing its benefits. The ability to conceal the solution enables the agent to extract rents from the principal. The optimal contract with commitment balances the agent's rents against the timeliness of the solution, and typically induces the a...
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作者：Bosker, Maarten; Westbrock, Bastian
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute; University of Hamburg
摘要：This paper develops a network perspective on the gains from trade in today's international supply chains. In particular, we demonstrate that the comparative statics predictions of a standard general -equilibrium trade model with input-output linkages can be expressed as a network diffusion model. This model captures the relevant dimensions of the production network's structure by just two easily quantifiable statistics: A country's upstream exposure to supply shocks further up in the network a...
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作者：Mora, Ernesto Rivera
摘要：This paper studies mechanism design when agents have belief -dependent preferences, in that utilities depend on the agents' hierarchical posterior beliefs about types. For instance, agents may be subject to temptation, shame, image concerns, or privacy concerns. In this setting, the textbook revelation principle does not hold, since mechanisms can provide agents with information that affects posterior beliefs. This paper uses a psychological game framework suited for mechanism design, and prov...
