Public goods in networks with constraints on sharing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gerke, Stefanie; Gutin, Gregory; Hwang, Sung-Ha; Neary, Philip R.
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of London; Royal Holloway University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105844
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: NETWORKS; Public Good Provision; Constrained sharing; Endogenous network formation

摘要

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides which subset of neighbours to nominate as co- beneficiaries. An outcome of the model specifies an endogenously generated subnetwork and a public goods game occurring over the realised subnetwork. We prove the existence of specialised pure strategy Nash equilibria: those in which some individuals contribute while the remaining individuals free ride. We then consider how the set of efficient specialised equilibria vary as the constraints on sharing are relaxed and we show that, paradoxically, an increase in shareability may decrease efficiency.