Fomenting conflict *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Szydlowski, Martin
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105875
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; war of attrition; Exogenous news; Shifting rhetoric; propaganda

摘要

I study information disclosure as a means to create conflict. A sender aims to keep two parties engaged in a war of attrition and reveals information about their relative strength. In the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, the sender employs shifting rhetoric: she alternates pipetting good and bad news about each party, so that neither appears too strong. Information designed to induce one party to continue fighting weakens the other party's incentives. This spillover effect may lead to early resolution and leave the sender worse off. With commitment, the sender provides delayed noisy disclosures. A partisan sender, who favors one party, instead provides information which leads to immediate resolution.