Delegated recruitment and statistical discrimination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aleksenko, Stepan; Kohlhepp, Jacob
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105936
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: delegation; CONTRACTS; Recruiters; screening; DISCRIMINATION

摘要

We study how delegated recruitment shapes talent selection. Firms often pay recruiters via refund contracts, which specify a payment upon the hire of a suggested candidate and a refund if a candidate is hired but terminated during an initial period of employment. We develop a model of delegated recruitment and show that refund contracts with strong screening incentives lead to statistical discrimination in favor of candidates with more precise productivity information. This contrasts with a first-best direct-hiring benchmark, where the firm has option value from uncertain candidates. Under tractable parametric assumptions, we provide a closed-form expression for the unique equilibrium contract and show that it features strong screening incentives. As a result, candidates with lower expected productivity but more informative signals (safe bets) are hired over candidates with higher expected productivity but less informative signals (diamonds in the rough).