Private polling in elections and voter welfare

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernhardt, Dan; Duggan, John; Squintani, Francesco
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Rochester; University of Rochester; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.013
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 2021-2056
• 关键词: Elections; Platform divergence; spending caps; political campaigns; polling

摘要

We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms. Policy convergence does not maximize voters' welfare. Although candidates' platforms diverge in equilibrium, they do not do so as much as voters would like. We find that the electorate always prefers less correlation in candidate signals, and thus private over public polling. Some noise in the polling technology raises voters' welfare. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.