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作者：Chattopadhyay, Subir
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser [Assessing dynamic efficiency: theory and evidence, Rev. Econ. Stud. 56 (1989) 1-20] propose the net dividend criterion as an easy to use sufficient condition for optimality in general stochastic overlapping generations economies with production. We provide examples based on the criterion due to Cass [On capital overaccumulation in the aggregative neoclassical model of economic growth: a complete characterization, J. Econ. Theory 4 (1972) 200-223] and its ...
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作者：Keppo, Jussi; Moscarini, Giuseppe; Smith, Lones
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper produces a theory of value for Gaussian information with two states and two actions, tracing the solution of the option pricing formula, but for the process of beliefs. We derive explicit formulas for the value of information. The marginal value is convex and rising, concave and peaking, and finally convex and falling. As the price falls, demand is initially zero, and eventually logarithmic. Its elasticity exceeds one, and falls to zero with the price. Demand is hill-shaped in belie...
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作者：Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Yonsei University
摘要：I compare two information structures in a common value first-price auction with two bidders: In one, each of the two bidders knows only his own signal about the value of the object, and in the other, one of the bidders learns his opponent's signal as well. Gaining the additional information in the second information structure makes the informed bidder worse off if the value is submodular in the bidders' signals and better off if it is supermodular. If the value is supermodular, then the seller...
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作者：Dang, Tri Vi
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper analyses information acquisition in ultimatum bargaining with common values. Because of an endogenous lemons problem the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are non-monotonic in the information cost. The mere possibility of information acquisition can cause no trade although the agents maintain symmetric information in equilibrium and the gain from trade is common knowledge. The agent responding to a take-it-or-leave-it offer may capture some or even the full trading surplus in a perf...
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作者：Ennis, Huberto M.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：I study monetary exchange and inflation when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for certain goods. Introducing imperfect information in the Lagos-Wright [A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113(3) (2005) 463-484] economy shows that the existence of monetary equilibrium is a more robust feature of the environment. In general, my model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who...
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作者：Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper develops a search-theoretic model of the cross-sectional distribution of asset returns, abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively on liquidity. In contrast with much of the transaction-cost literature, it is not assumed that different assets carry different exogenously specified trading costs. Instead, different expected returns, due to liquidity, are explained by the cross-sectional variation in tradeable shares. The qualitative predictions of the model are consistent w...
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作者：Levin, Dan; Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study a dynamic investment game with two-dimensional signals, where each firm observes its continuously distributed idiosyncratic cost of investment and a discrete signal correlated with common investment returns. We demonstrate that the one-step property holds and provide an equilibrium existence/characterization result. Reversals are possible, where a large number of firms investing in a given round becomes bad news about investment returns. Welfare is compared to static and rigid-timing ...
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作者：Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Simon Fraser University
摘要：We study the Diamond-Dybvig [Bank runs, deposit insurance. and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419] model as developed in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] and Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs. J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in record-keeping. W...
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作者：Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Hitotsubashi University
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作者：Toxvaerd, Flavio
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper proposes an explanation of merger waves based on the interaction between competitive pressure and irreversibility of mergers in an uncertain environment. A set of acquirers compete over time for scarce targets. At each point in time, an acquirer can either postpone a takeover attempt or raid immediately. By postponing the takeover attempt, an acquirer may gain from more favorable future market conditions, but runs the risk of being preempted by rivals. First, a complete information ...
