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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This introduces the symposium on monetary and macro economics. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Beker, Pablo F.
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：In the early stages of the process of industry evolution, firms are financially constrained and might pay different wages to workers according to their expectations about the prospects for advancement offered by each firm's job ladder. This paper argues that, nevertheless, if the output market is competitive, the positive predictions of the perfectly competitive model are still a good description of the long run outcome. If firms maximize the discounted sum of its assets, financing expenditure...
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作者：Bloise, Gaetano; Calciano, Filippo L.
作者单位：Roma Tre University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper, we provide a characterization of interim inefficiency in stochastic economies of overlapping generations. With respect to the established body of results in the literature, we allow for sequentially incomplete markets and we remove the hypothesis of two-period horizons, by considering longer, though uniformly bounded, horizons for generations. The characterization exploits a suitably Modified Cass Criterion, based entirely on observable prices and independent of the length of th...
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作者：Chassang, Sylvain
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 989-1018] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking compar...
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作者：Edmond, Chris
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper develops a method for solving for the dynamic general equilibrium of a deterministic continuous time overlapping generations model with a finite-horizon life-cycle. The model has isoelastic preferences and allows for general assumptions about individual endowments and demographics. Solving for an equilibrium reduces to solving a nonlinear integral equation. In the special case of log utility, the integral equation is linear and global approximations to a solution are easily computed...
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作者：Araujo, Luis; Camargo, Braz
作者单位：Michigan State University; FUCAPE Business School; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We consider whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a long-lived self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a choice of money supply, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that monetary equilibria with no overissue do not exist when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currenc...
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作者：Evstigneev, Igor V.; Hens, Thorsten; Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner
作者单位：University of Leeds; University of Manchester; University of Zurich; University of Leeds
摘要：The paper examines a dynamic model of a financial market with endogenous asset prices determined by short-run equilibrium of supply and demand. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and partially reinvested. The traders use fixed-mix investment strategies (portfolio rules), distributing their wealth between assets in fixed proportions. Our main goal is to identify globally evolutionarily stable strategies, allowing an investor to survive, i.e., to accumulate in the long run a positi...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA
摘要：This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about...
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作者：Koutsougeras, Leonidas C.; Ziros, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Manchester; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In view of the well known core equivalence results in atomless economics, coincidence of market game equilibrium allocations with competitive allocations is tantamount to a three way equivalence between market game mechanisms, competitive equilibria and the core. Based on this idea we study equilibrium refinements of market games, which allow us to use the core equivalence machinery in order to provide an exact market game characterization of competitive equilibria. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All ...
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作者：Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference, which excludes the possibility of a money pump. The properties of collective choice rules used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are al...
