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作者：Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Toronto
摘要：We study the effect of stochastically delayed communication on common knowledge acquisition (common learning). If messages do not report dispatch times, communication prevents common learning under general conditions even if common knowledge is acquired without communication. If messages report dispatch times, communication can destroy common learning under more restrictive conditions. The failure of common learning in the two cases is based on different infection arguments. Communication can ...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Schlag, Karl
作者单位：Yale University; University of Vienna
摘要：We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin utility and (ii) minimax regret. The equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertaint...
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作者：Franco, April Mitchell; Mitchell, Matthew; Vereshchagina, Galina
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies the relationship between moral hazard and the matching structure of teams. We show that team incentive problems may generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities in the production technology. Second, we analyze how complementarity in the underlying technology affects the matching predictions arising due to moral hazard. We find that (i) even when the production technology is strongly complementary, the incentive problem may lead to formation of n...
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作者：Broer, Tobias
摘要：When the risk of default constrains financial contracts, public insurance policies can significantly affect private risk-sharing. This is because by changing income expectations and volatility, redistribution changes the attractiveness of default and thus endogenous borrowing constraints. Extending results by Krueger and Perri (2011) [8], this paper analyses the conditions under which redistribution can improve private insurance by making default less attractive to the income-rich, whose incom...
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作者：Figalli, Alessio; Kim, Young-Heon; McCann, Robert J.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of British Columbia
摘要：A principal wishes to transact business with a multidimensional distribution of agents whose preferences are known only in the aggregate. Assuming a twist (= generalized Spence-Mirdees single-crossing) hypothesis, quasi-linear utilities, and that agents can choose only pure strategies, we identify a structural condition on the value b(x, y) of product type y to agent type x - and on the principal's costs c(y) - which is necessary and sufficient for reducing the profit maximization problem face...
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作者：Schwarz, Michael; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：Microsoft; Yahoo! Inc; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with wages and prove constructively that it exists. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Stauber, Ronald
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper introduces a notion of robustness to ambiguous beliefs for Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is robust if the corresponding strategies remain approximately optimal for a class of games with ambiguous beliefs that results from an appropriately defined perturbation of the belief structure of the original non-ambiguous belief game. The robustness definition is based on a novel definition of equilibrium for games with ambiguous beliefs that requires equilibrium strategies to be a...
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作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains, but is not restricted to, quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the manipulability of the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair (GMRF) solutions. (i) We show that the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each GMRF solution coincide with the no-envy solution (in equilibrium, efficiency is pr...
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作者：Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Brown University
摘要：We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the best element property where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the hest element property ...
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作者：Oprea, Ryan; Henwood, Keith; Friedman, Daniel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Chicago
摘要：Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive pr...
