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作者：Corbae, Dean; Marimon, Ramon
作者单位：European University Institute; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This introduces the symposium on incompleteness and uncertainty in economics. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Gu, Chao
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding effects, because in these models withdrawal decisions are assumed to be made simultaneously. I extend the banking model to allow a depositor to choose his withdrawal time. When he withdraws depends on his consumption type (patient or impatient), his private, noisy signal about the quality of the bank's portfolio, and the withdrawal histories of the other depositors. Some of these runs are efficient in that the bank is liquidated before t...
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作者：Berentsen, Aleksander; Waller, Christopher
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Basel; University of Notre Dame
摘要：When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist sell assets or borrow. We compare the allocations arising in two economies: in one, agents can sell government (outside) bonds and in the other they can borrow by issuing (inside) bonds. All transactions are voluntary, implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any allocation in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds but that the converse is not true. However, the op...
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作者：Bloise, Gaetano; Reichlin, Pietro
作者单位：Roma Tre University; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We consider (possibly non-stationary) economies with endogenous solvency constraints under uncertainty over an infinite horizon, as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) [5]. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass, 1972 [10]) completely characterizes constrained inefficiency under the hypothesis of uniform gains from risk-sharing (which is always satisfied in stationary economies when the autarchy is constrained inefficient). Uniform gains from risk-sharing also guarantee a finite value of the intertemporal a...
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作者：Chau, Nancy H.; Faere, Rolf
作者单位：Cornell University; Oregon State University
摘要：Appropriate assessment of the social value of market access is at the core of a broad range of inquiries in trade research. We propose a new approach based on a trade benefit function to obtain the shadow value of net imports. Our approach is in keeping with well-established trade welfare measurement techniques, for the trade benefit function is dual to the standard trade expenditure function. This dual relation further allows for a direct retrieval of the shadow values of net imports from the...
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作者：Duffy, John; Matros, Alexander; Temzelides, Ted
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Rice University
摘要：We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1973) [21]. Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some or possibly all markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but favor more efficient Nash equilibria in which all markets are open. As the number of subjects participating in the market game increases, the Nash equilibrium they achieve approxima...
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作者：Krusell, Per; Mukoyama, Toshihiko; Rogerson, Richard; Sahin, Ayseguel
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Virginia; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We develop a simple model featuring search frictions and a nondegenerate labor supply decision along the extensive margin. The model is a standard version of the neoclassical growth model with indivisible labor and idiosyncratic productivity shocks and frictions characterized by employment loss and employment opportunity arrival shocks. We argue that it is able to account for the key features of observed labor market flows for reasonable parameter values. Persistent idiosyncratic productivity ...
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作者：Cres, Herve; Gilboa, Itzhak; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Tel Aviv University
摘要：Experts are asked to provide their advice in a situation of uncertainty. They adopt the decision maker's utility function, but each has a potentially different set of prior probabilities, and so does the decision maker. The decision maker and the experts maximize the minimal expected utility with respect to their sets of priors. We show that a natural Pareto condition is equivalent to the existence of a set Lambda of probability vectors over the experts, interpreted as possible allocations of ...
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作者：Ghiglino, Christian; Venditti, Alain
作者单位：University of Essex; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School
摘要：We explore the link between wealth inequality and output fluctuations in a general two-sector neoclassical growth model with endogenous labor and heterogeneous agents. When agents have homogeneous CRRA preferences and individual wealth is Pareto distributed, a sufficiently large rise in the Gini index typically leads to an increase in endogenous fluctuations of output. For general economies, we show that under plausible conditions on the fundamentals, wealth inequality is still a destabilizing...
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作者：Weretka, Marek
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：In this paper we develop a framework to study markets with heterogeneous atomic traders. The competitive model is augmented as we provide traders with correct beliefs about their price impacts to define equilibrium with endogenously determined market power and show that such equilibrium exists in economies with smooth utility and cost functions and is generically determinate. Traders' price impacts depend positively on the convexity of preferences or cost functions of the trading partners and ...
