Robust monopoly pricing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, Dirk; Schlag, Karl
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.018
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2527-2543
• 关键词: Monopoly; Robustness; multiple priors; Maximin utility; minimax regret; robust mechanism design

摘要

We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin utility and (ii) minimax regret. The equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty. The concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.