Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stauber, Ronald
• 署名单位: Australian National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.008
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 248-274
• 关键词: Bayesian games; Knightian uncertainty; ambiguity; Robustness

摘要

This paper introduces a notion of robustness to ambiguous beliefs for Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is robust if the corresponding strategies remain approximately optimal for a class of games with ambiguous beliefs that results from an appropriately defined perturbation of the belief structure of the original non-ambiguous belief game. The robustness definition is based on a novel definition of equilibrium for games with ambiguous beliefs that requires equilibrium strategies to be approximate best responses for all measures that define a player's belief. Conditions are derived under which robustness is characterized by a newly defined strategic continuity property, which can be verified without reference to perturbations and corresponding ambiguous belief games. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.