Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oprea, Ryan; Henwood, Keith; Friedman, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.014
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2206-2225
• 关键词: evolutionary dynamics; Hawk-dove game; game theory; laboratory experiment; Continuous time game

摘要

Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive predictions of evolutionary game theory. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.