Are incentives against economic justice?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Velez, Rodrigo A.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.005
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 326-345
• 关键词: Efficiency; fairness; Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair solutions; implementation; indivisible goods; manipulation; mechanism design; No-envy

摘要

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains, but is not restricted to, quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the manipulability of the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair (GMRF) solutions. (i) We show that the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each GMRF solution coincide with the no-envy solution (in equilibrium, efficiency is preserved according to agents' true preferences). (ii) A corollary is that the GMRF solutions naturally implement the no-envy solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.