Incentives and the structure of teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Franco, April Mitchell; Mitchell, Matthew; Vereshchagina, Galina
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.006
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2307-2332
• 关键词: Moral hazard; teams; assortative matching

摘要

This paper studies the relationship between moral hazard and the matching structure of teams. We show that team incentive problems may generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities in the production technology. Second, we analyze how complementarity in the underlying technology affects the matching predictions arising due to moral hazard. We find that (i) even when the production technology is strongly complementary, the incentive problem may lead to formation of negatively sorted teams; (ii) as the degree of complementarity increases, the optimal matching structure may switch from positive to negative, solely due to the need to provide incentives. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.