A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University; McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Brown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.02.005
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2583-2595
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Exact and approximate implementation; Iteratively undominated strategies; Restricted deception-proofness; incentive compatibility; Measurability

摘要

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the best element property where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the hest element property must be employed. We term the condition restricted deception-proofness. It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.