A folk theorem for competing mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peters, Michael; Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.01.001
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 953-973
• 关键词: Competing mechanisms; collusion; Implementable

摘要

We provide a partial characterization of the set of outcome functions that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the recommendation game described in [T. Yamashita, Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents, Econometrica 78 (2) (2010) 791-801]. We show that the set of outcome functions that can be supported is at least as large as the set supportable by a mechanism designer in the sense of Myerson (Myerson, 1979 [13]). We show how to support random and correlated outcomes as equilibrium outcomes in the recommendation game. Crown Copyright (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.