Pricing and signaling with frictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Delacroix, Alain; Shi, Shouyong
• 署名单位: University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.006
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1301-1332
• 关键词: search; signaling; pricing; EFFICIENCY; bargaining

摘要

We study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites. Observing sellers' choices of prices and sites, but not quality, buyers choose which site to visit. A seller's choices of prices can direct buyers' search and signal quality. A unique equilibrium exists and is separating. When the quality differential is large, the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information. Otherwise, the quality of goods and/or the number of sites created is inefficient, due to a conflict between the search-directing and signaling roles of prices. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.