A two-sided reputation result with long-run players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
• 署名单位: Koc University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 376-392
• 关键词: Repeated games; reputation; Equal discount factor; Long-run players; war of attrition

摘要

We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. Alternatively, if the stage game is a common-interest game, then the players' equilibrium payoffs converge to their highest payoffs as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.