Mechanism design without revenue equivalence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Ely, Jeffrey C.
• 署名单位: University of Queensland; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.014
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 104-133
• 关键词: Incentive compatibility; revenue equivalence; Integral monotonicity; revenue maximization; loss aversion; EFFICIENCY; public goods; Non-contractible actions

摘要

We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. We obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility based on the Mirrlees representation of the indirect utility and a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule, which pin down the range of possible payoffs as a function of the allocation rule. To illustrate our approach we derive the optimal selling mechanism in a buyer seller situation where the buyer is loss-averse; we find a budget-balanced, efficient mechanism in a public goods location model; and we consider a principal agent model with ex post non-contractible actions available to the agent. Crown Copyright (C) 2012 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.