Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nora, Vladyslav; Uno, Hiroshi
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain; Osaka Metropolitan University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 866-877
• 关键词: Incomplete information; Robustness; potential; Team-maximin equilibrium

摘要

We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Moths and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.