Revision proofness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ales, Laurence; Sleet, Christopher
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.008
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 324-355
• 关键词: Dynamic games; repeated games; renegotiation-proofness; Equilibrium refinements

摘要

We analyze an equilibrium concept called revision-proofness for infinite-horizon games played by a dynasty of players. Revision-proofness requires strategies to be robust to joint deviations by multiple players and is a refinement of sub-game perfection. Sub-game perfect paths that can only be sustained by reversion to paths with payoffs below those of an alternative path are not revision-proof. However, for the important class of quasi-recursive games careful construction of off-equilibrium play can render many, and in some cases all, sub-game perfect paths revision-proof. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.