Constrained interactions and social coordination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Staudigl, Mathias; Weidenholzer, Simon
• 署名单位: University of Bielefeld; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 41-63
• 关键词: Coordination games; equilibrium selection; learning; network formation

摘要

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2 x 2-coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that if agents may only support a limited number of links payoff dominant conventions will emerge in the long run, contrasting the case of unconstrained interactions where risk dominant conventions arise for a wide range of parameters. Under constrained iterations, already a small number of agents choosing the payoff dominant action enables agents - by linking up to those agents and choosing the payoff dominant action - to secure themselves the highest possible payoff. We extend our model by discussing constrained interactions in the context of general m x m games, convex payoff functions, heterogeneous constraints, and frictions in link formation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.