Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casajus, Andre; Huettner, Frank
• 署名单位: HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.004
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 162-172
• 关键词: Egalitarian Shapley values; redistribution; Solidarity; TU games; Weak monotonicity

摘要

The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values that satisfy efficiency, symmetry, and weak monotonicity. It turns out that this class coincides with the class of egalitarian Shapley values. Thus, weak monotonicity reflects the nature of the egalitarian Shapley values in the same vein as strong monotonicity reflects the nature of the Shapley value. An egalitarian Shapley value redistributes the Shapley payoffs as follows: First, the Shapley payoffs are taxed proportionally at a fixed rate. Second, the total tax revenue is distributed equally among all players. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.