Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Allison, Blake A.; Lepore, Jason J.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 291-303
• 关键词: Discontinuous games; Nash equilibrium; Disjoint payoff matching; EXISTENCE

摘要

We introduce the concept of disjoint payoff matching which can be used to show that the mixed extension of a compact game is payoff secure. By putting minor structure on the discontinuities, we need only check payoffs at each strategy rather than in neighborhoods of each strategy profile, placing minimal restriction on the payoffs at points of discontinuity. The results are used to verify existence of equilibrium in a general model of Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.