Looting and risk shifting in banking crises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boyd, John H.; Hakenes, Hendrik
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Bonn; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 43-64
• 关键词: Looting; Stealing; Tunneling; Risk shifting; asset substitution; gambling

摘要

We construct a model of the banking firm with inside and outside equity and use it to study bank behavior and regulatory policy during crises. In our model, a bank can increase the risk of its asset portfolio (risk shift), convert bank assets to the personal benefit of the bank manager (loot), or do both. A regulator has three policy tools: it can restrict the bank's investment choices; it can make looting more costly; and it can force banks to hold more equity. Capital regulation may increase looting, and in extreme cases even risk shifting. Looting penalties reduce both looting and risk-shifting. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.