On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Masso, Jordi; Nicolo, Antonio; Sen, Arunava; Sharma, Tridib; Uelkue, Levent
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; University of Manchester; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 30-49
• 关键词: Binary public good; Excludability; Equal cost sharing; Maximal welfare loss

摘要

We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed, the ECSMP mechanism becomes optimal. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.