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作者：Couture, Victor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper proposes a micro-foundation for knowledge spillovers. I model a city in which free knowledge transfers are bids by experts to entrepreneurs who auction jobs. These knowledge bids resemble a consultant's pitch to a potential client. Two fundamental properties of knowledge underlie the model: First, it is often necessary to reveal some knowledge to demonstrate its value. Second, knowledge is freely reproducible. Larger cities generate more meetings between experts and entrepreneurs, r...
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作者：Gueron, Yves
作者单位：Sogang University
摘要：We consider a two-player Prisoner's Dilemma type game with continuous actions, where players choose how much to contribute to a public project. This game is played infinitely many times and actions are irreversible: players cannot decrease their actions over time. While it is strictly dominant for players not to contribute in the stage game, some strictly positive level of contribution is Pareto optimal. It is known that when players perfectly observe each other's actions, cooperation can be a...
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作者：Zhou, Junjie; Chen, Ying-Ju
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper examines optimal targeting and sequencing strategies in the setup proposed by Ballester et al. [3]. The setup features payoff externalities and strategic complementarily among players, who noncooperatively determine their contributions. We first analyze a two-stage game in which players in the leader group make contributions before the follower group. We construct an exact index to identify the (single) key leader, and demonstrate that the key leader can differ substantially from th...
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作者：Colombo, Luca; Labrecciosa, Paola
作者单位：Deakin University; Monash University
摘要：We characterize and compare closed-loop (feedback) price and quantity strategies within a full-fledged dynamic model of oligopolistic competition in which production requires exploitation of a renewable productive asset. Unlike previous papers on the strategic exploitation of productive assets, we allow for imperfect product substitutability, which enables us to deal with price competition. We show that the traditional result that the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equ...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：Yale University; University of Cologne
摘要：We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder's information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the winning bidder only has limited information, namely that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. The sequential mechanis...
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作者：McAvoy, Alex
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We give an alternative proof of a result of Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) on the embedded Markov chain of an imitation process with small mutations. Our proof also extends this result to more general imitation processes that, with rare mutations, have unique stationary distributions but are not necessarily irreducible. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition for when a multiproduct demand system can be generated from a discrete choice model with unit demands. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kurlat, Pablo; Veldkamp, Laura
摘要：Regulations that require asset issuers to disclose payoff-relevant information to potential buyers are often called investor protection. But even when they improve real economic efficiency, such regulations may still harm investors. By making payoffs less uncertain, information reduces risk and therefore reduces return. Similarly, real efficiency gains benefit only asset issuers, who can always choose to disclose. Providing information improves investors' welfare only when 1) issuers strategic...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Teper, Roee
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：When a potential hedge between alternatives does not reduce the exposure to uncertainty, we say that the decision maker considers these alternatives structurally similar. We offer a novel approach and suggest that structural similarity is subjective and should be different across decision makers. Structural similarity can be recovered through a property of the individual's preferences referred to as subjective codecomposable independence. This property characterizes a class of event-separable ...
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作者：Lambert, Nicolas S.; Langford, John; Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman; Chen, Yiling; Reeves, Daniel M.; Shoham, Yoav; Pennock, David M.
作者单位：Stanford University; Microsoft; Microsoft; Harvard University; Stanford University
摘要：We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event probabilities, as well as the mean, median, and other statistics from a group of individuals whose beliefs are immutable to the actions of others. We show how our mechanism, called the Brier betting mechanism, arises naturally from a modified parimutuel betting market. We prove that it is essentially the unique wagering mechanism that is anonymous, proportional, sybilproof and homogeneous. While th...
