Breakdown in multilateral negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goller, Daniel; Hewer, Michael
• 署名单位: University of Agder; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.013
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 478-484
• 关键词: Multilateral bargaining; Complete information; breakdown; Coase Theorem

摘要

We analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers. Binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. In contrast to preexisting literature, we do not normalize the parties' reservation utilities to zero. We show that this assumption holds critical importance by demonstrating that a complete breakdown of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome, even if only two sellers are present. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.