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作者：Caragiannis, Ioannis; Kaklamanis, Christos; Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis; Kyropoulou, Maria; Lucier, Brendan; Leme, Renato Paes; Tardos, Eva
作者单位：University of Patras; University of Patras; University of Oxford; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Cornell University
摘要：The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for monetizing the use of the Internet. It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise. Edelman et al. (2007) [11] and Varian (2007) [36] show that an efficient equilibrium always exists in the full information setting. Their results, however, do not extend to the case with uncertainty, where efficient equilibria might not exist. In this paper we study...
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作者：Schnakenberg, Keith E.
作者单位：University of Kentucky
摘要：I provide a theory of information transmission in collective choice settings. In the model, an expert has private information on the effect of a policy proposal and communicates to a set of voters prior to a vote over whether or not to implement the proposal. In contrast to previous game-theoretic models of political communication, the results apply to situations involving multiple voters, multidimensional policy spaces and a broad class of voting rules. The results highlight how experts can u...
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作者：Lambson, Val; van den Berghe, John
作者单位：Brigham Young University; University of Chicago
摘要：We present a win-loss game between players with explicitly-modeled cognitive limitations. Differences in the players' abilities to analyze the available moves induce preferences over the complexity of the environment and hence incentives to manipulate that complexity. Other things equal, higher-skill players are more likely to win. In a class of long-horizon games with constant complexity, greater complexity reduces the advantage of the higher-skill player when the higher-skill player is the l...
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作者：Allouch, Nizar
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors' provisions. We present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for general networks and best-reply functions. In addition, we investigate the neutrality result of Wan [38] and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian [6] whereby consumers are able to undo the impact of income redistribution as well as public provision fi...
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作者：Araujo, Luis; Guimaraes, Bernardo
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Michigan State University
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium selection in intertemporal coordination problems with delay options. The risk-dominant action of the underlying one-shot game is selected when frictions are arbitrarily small. Larger frictions introduce real option effects in the model and inhibit coordination. (c) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dobzinski, Shahar; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study environments with m homogenous items and two bidders, where the private information of each bidder consists of a monotone valuation (multi-unit auctions). We analyze ex-post implementable social choice functions where the dominant strategy of a bidder is to reveal his valuation. A result by Green and Laffont [8] implies that an efficient outcome can only be ex-post implemented by VCG payments. However, the VCG mechanism has well-known drawbacks, such as low revenue and computational i...
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作者：Eeckhout, Jan; Weng, Xi
作者单位：University of London; University College London; ICREA; Peking University
摘要：In many economic environments, agents often continue to learn about the same underlying state variable, even if they switch action. For example, a worker's ability revealed in one job or when unemployed is informative about her productivity in another job. We analyze a general setup of experimentation with common values, and show that in addition to the well-known conditions of value matching (level) and smooth pasting (first derivative), this implies that the second derivatives of the value f...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Romm, Assaf
作者单位：Yale University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In complete information games, Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) and Borgers (1994) have proposed the solution concept (SW)-W-infinity (one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies), motivating it by a characterization in terms of approximate common certainty of admissibility. We examine the validity of this characterization of (SW)-W-infinity in an incomplete information setting. We argue that in Bayesian games with a nontr...
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作者：Challe, Edouard; Chretien, Edouard
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); European Central Bank; Bank of France
摘要：We analyse the joint determination of price informativeness and the composition of the market by order type in a large asset market with dispersed information. The market microstructure is one in which informed traders may place market orders or full demand schedules and where market makers set the price. Market-order traders trade less aggressively on their information and thus reduce the informativeness of the price; in a full market-order market, price informativeness is bounded, whatever t...
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作者：Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Koc University; Boston College
摘要：We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage-game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage-game actions of player one perfectly. Player one's type is private information and he may be a commitment type, drawn from a countable set of commitment types, who is locked into playing a particular strategy. Under a full-support assumption on the monitoring structu...
