Payoffs in exact TU economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Edhan, Omer
• 署名单位: University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.012
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 152-184
• 关键词: Perfect competition; Value theory; large economies

摘要

We prove that a single-valued solution of perfectly competitive TU economies underlying nonatomic exact market games is uniquely determined as the Mertens [23] value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always a core element, this result provides an axiomatization of the Mertens value as a core-selection. Previous works in this direction assumed the economies to be either differentiable (e.g., Dubey and Neyman [11]) or of uniform finite-type (e.g., Haimanko [16]). Our work does not assume that, thus it contributes to the axiomatic study of payoffs in perfectly competitive economies (or values of their derived market games) in general. In fact, this is the first contribution in this direction. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.