Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
• 署名单位: Lund University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.01.010
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 167-177
• 关键词: House allocation; matching; Price restrictions; strategy-proofness; Domain restriction

摘要

This paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions. This type of housing market contains, e.g., the assignment market and the student placement problem as special cases. A mechanism called the minimal RPE mechanism is defined, and two main results are obtained. First, it is demonstrated that the mechanism is manipulable at some profile in the full preference domain R. Second, it is proved that there is a subset (R) over tilde subset of R. of the full domain, containing almost all profiles in R, such that the minimal RPE mechanism is strategy-proof in that subset. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.