-
作者：Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick
作者单位：Max Planck Society; University of Cologne; University of Zurich
摘要：We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that differ with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satisfies an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all efficient social ch...
-
作者：Branch, William; McGough, Bruce
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Oregon
摘要：Heterogeneous beliefs are introduced into the monetary economy of Lagos and Wright (2005) and the implications for monetary equilibria are considered. An endogenous fraction of agents hold rational expectations and the remaining agents employ an adaptive learning rule similar to Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Brock and Hommes (1997). Three primary results follow from the finding that heterogeneous beliefs can destabilize a stationary monetary equilibrium and lead to non-linear dynamics bounde...
-
作者：Carroll, Gabriel
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Two agents can each accept or reject a proposed deal, whose value for each agent depends on an unknown state, and may be positive or negative. The deal takes place only if both accept. Each agent can be imperfectly informed, in an arbitrary way, about both her own value and the other agent's. In such environments, contagious adverse selection may prevent the deal from being reached even when it is mutually beneficial ex post. We give an upper bound on the ex-ante expected welfare loss in equil...
-
作者：Han, Han; Julien, Benoit; Petursdottir, Asgerdur; Wang, Liang
作者单位：Peking University; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Bath; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
摘要：This note studies the trade of indivisible goods using credit or money in a frictional market. We show how indivisibility matters for monetary equilibrium under different assumptions about price determination. Bargaining generates a price and allocation that are independent of the nominal interest or inflation rate over some range. This is not the case with price posting and directed search. In either case, we provide conditions (the nominal rate cannot be too high) under which stationary mone...
-
作者：Amir, Rabah; Lazzati, Natalia
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：This paper studies covert (or hidden) information acquisition in common value Bayesian games of strategic complementarities. Using the supermodular stochastic order to arrange the structures of information increasingly in terms of preferences, we provide novel, easily interpretable and verifiable, though restrictive conditions under which the value of information is increasing and convex, and study the implications in terms of the equilibrium configuration. Increasing marginal returns to infor...
-
作者：Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun Song; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Princeton University; Bank for International Settlements (BIS); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defined as the probability the players assign to their payoff parameters being higher than their opponents'. We argue that this is the driving force behind selection results for the specific type spaces in the global games lit...
-
作者：Fabbri, Giorgio
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We introduce an AK spatial growth model with a general geographical structure. The dynamics of the economy is described by a partial differential equation on a Riemannian manifold. The morphology interacts with the spatial dynamics of the capital and is one determinant of the qualitative behavior of the economy. We characterize the conditions on the geographical structure that guarantee convergence of the detrended capital across locations in the long run, and those inducing spatial capital ag...
-
作者：Frankel, Alexander
摘要：This paper extends the concept of a quota contract to account for discounting and for the possibility of infinitely many periods: a discounted quota fixes the number of expected discounted plays on each action. I first present a repeated principal-agent contracting environment in which menus of discounted quota contracts are optimal. I then recursively characterize the dynamics of discounted quotas for an infinitely repeated iid problem. Dynamics are described more explicitly for the limit as ...
-
作者：Thanh Nguyen; Peivandi, Ahmad; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：The problem of allocating bundles of indivisible objects without transfers arises in many practical settings, including the assignment of courses to students, of siblings to schools, and of truckloads of food to food banks. In these settings, the complementarities in preferences are small compared with the size of the market. We exploit this to design mechanisms satisfying constrained efficiency and asymptotic strategy-proofness. We introduce two mechanisms, one for cardinal and the other for ...
-
作者：Gershkov, Alex; Li, Jianpei; Schweinzer, Paul
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of International Business & Economics; University of Klagenfurt
摘要：We study the role of information exchange, leadership, and coordination in team and partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes a team as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once each team member decides on whether or not to share his private information truthfully, he chooses which effort to exert in the joint production process. This effort, however, is not contractible: only the re...
