Goals and bracketing under mental accounting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koch, Alexander K.; Nafziger, Julia
• 署名单位: Aarhus University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.01.001
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 305-351
• 关键词: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting; reference-dependent preferences; self-control; Mental accounting; Choice bracketing; goals

摘要

Behavioral economics struggles to explain why people sometimes evaluate outcomes separately (narrow bracketing of mental accounts) and sometimes jointly (broad bracketing). We develop a theory of endogenous bracketing, where people set goals to tackle self-control problems. Goals induce reference points that make substandard performance painful. Evaluating goals in a broadly bracketed mental account insulates an individual from exogenous risk of failure; but because decisions or risks in different tasks become substitutes there are incentives to deviate from goals that are absent under narrow bracketing. Extensions include goal revision, naivete about self-control, income targeting, and firms' bundling strategies. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.