Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peck, James
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.001
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 126-161
• 关键词: Competing mechanisms; Multi-unit demand; Entry fees

摘要

The competing mechanisms literature is extended to a market setting in which firms have fixed capacity, and there is a continuum of consumers who desire multiple units and can only purchase from one firm. Firms choose incentive compatible mechanisms in which consumers report their utility types; consumption of the good and payments of the numeraire are continuous functions of the reports. Uniform price auctions with reserve prices, reinterpreted as direct mechanisms, are not consistent with equilibrium. However, modified auctions without reserve prices but with type-specific entry fees do constitute an equilibrium of the competing mechanisms game under additional regularity assumptions. When all firms announce fixed prices at the perfectly competitive level, this profile also constitutes an equilibrium of the competing mechanisms game. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.