Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Glode, Vincent; Opp, Christian C.; Zhang, Xingtan
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 652-688
• 关键词: Information design; disclosure; asymmetric information; market power; persuasion

摘要

We characterize optimal voluntary disclosures by a privately informed agent facing a counterparty endowed with market power in a bilateral transaction. Although disclosures reveal some of the agent's private information, they may increase his information rents by mitigating the counterparty's incentives to resort to inefficient screening. We show that when disclosures are restricted to be ex post verifiable, the informed agent optimally designs a disclosure plan that is partial and that implements socially efficient trade in equilibrium. Our results shed light on the conditions necessary for asymmetric information to impede trade and the determinants of disclosures' coarseness. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.