Invariance of the equilibrium set of games with an endogenous sharing rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
• 署名单位: University of Surrey; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-33
• 关键词: Games with an endogenous sharing rule; discontinuous games; equilibrium; Invariance

摘要

We consider games with an endogenous sharing rule and provide conditions for the invariance of the equilibrium set, i.e., for the existence of a common equilibrium set for the games defined by each possible sharing rule. Applications of our results include Bertrand competition with convex costs, electoral competition, and contests. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.