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作者：Lambert, Nicolas S.; Marple, Adrian; Shoham, Yoav
作者单位：Stanford University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Stanford University
摘要：We generalize the modified multiselves approach of Piccione and Rubinstein to (multiplayer) games of imperfect recall. Four solution concepts are introduced: the multiselves agent equilibrium, the multiselves Nash equilibrium, the multiselves sequential equilibrium, and the multiselves perfect equilibrium. These modified equilibrium notions satisfy two important properties not fulfilled by the original ones. First, they always exist: every finite extensive game has at least one multiselves equ...
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作者：Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We consider a two-player discounted repeated game with private monitoring and free communication. We analyze two related types of information structures. In the first, each player observes a random signal that contains his own payoff with a positive probability. In this model we show how to support a rich set of payoffs as sequential equilibrium outcomes. In the second model the players observe only their own payoffs and a signal indicating whether the opponent observed his own. In this model ...
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作者：Beissner, Patrick; Khan, M. Ali
作者单位：Australian National University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We consider finite-player simultaneous-play games of private information in which a player has no prior belief concerning the information under which the other players take their decisions, and which he therefore cannot discern. This dissonance leads us to develop the notion of Hurwicz-Nash equilibria of non-Bayesian games, and to present a theorem on the existence of such an equilibrium in a finite-action setting. Our pure-strategy equilibrium is based on non-expected utility under ambiguity ...
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作者：Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); Queens University - Canada; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Holmstrom (1979) provides a condition for a signal to have positive value assuming the validity of the first-order approach. This paper extends Holmstrom's analysis to settings where the first-order approach may not hold. We provide a new condition for a signal to have positive value that takes non-local incentive constraints into account and holds generically. Our condition is the weakest condition possible in the absence of restrictions on the utility function. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rig...
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作者：Roberti, Paolo
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：This paper analyzes a model of electoral competition with uncertainty on the policy implemented by candidates. I show that this uncertainty can induce risk-averse voters to elect politicians whose policies are biased. I apply these results to a lobbying game, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies once elected. I show that voters elect politicians who implement policies biased in favor of the lobby. Increasing the probability of non-pandering can...
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作者：Banerjee, Anurag N.; Markovich, Sarit; Seccia, Giulio
作者单位：Durham University; Nazarbayev University; Northwestern University; Nazarbayev University
摘要：On December 1st, 2009 President Obama announced that the U.S. troops would have started leaving Afghanistan on July 2011. Rather than simply waiting the U.S. troops out, the Taliban forces responded with a spike in attacks followed by a decline as the withdrawal date approached. These, at first, counter-intuitive phenomena, are addressed by studying a two-player, zero-sum game where the duration of the strategic interaction is either known or unknown (i.e., the game can stop at any time with p...
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作者：Bernergard, Axel; Mohlin, Erik
作者单位：Sodertorn University; Lund University
摘要：This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Minozzi, William; Woon, Jonathan
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We experimentally investigate the effect of a second opinion on information transmission. Our design varies the number of senders as well as the alignment and magnitude of senders' biases in a sequential, cheap-talk, sender-receiver game. We find that decision makers do no better when a second opinion is available, irrespective of the alignment or competition between advisers, than when they receive a single opinion. Despite the fact that messaging behavior differs across experimental conditio...
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作者：Saucet, Charlotte; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：The memory people have of their past behavior is one of the main sources of information about themselves. To study whether people retrieve their memory self-servingly in social encounters, we designed an experiment in which participants play binary dictator games and then have to recall the amounts allocated to the receivers. We find evidence of motivated memory through selective recalls: dictators remember more their altruistic than their selfish choices. A causal effect of the responsibility...
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作者：Barigozzi, Francesca; Burani, Nadia
作者单位：University of Bologna; University of Bologna
摘要：We study optimal non-linear contracts offered by a non-profit and a for-profit firm competing to attract workers, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Motivated workers are keen to be hired by the non-profit firm because they adhere to its mission. Workers with different ability self-select into firms depending on which organization holds a competitive advantage. This determines the sign and the composition of the wage differential between firms, which encompasses lab...
