The informativeness principle without the first-order approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); Queens University - Canada; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.006
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 743-755
• 关键词: Contract theory; principal-agent model; Informativeness principle

摘要

Holmstrom (1979) provides a condition for a signal to have positive value assuming the validity of the first-order approach. This paper extends Holmstrom's analysis to settings where the first-order approach may not hold. We provide a new condition for a signal to have positive value that takes non-local incentive constraints into account and holds generically. Our condition is the weakest condition possible in the absence of restrictions on the utility function. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.