Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernergard, Axel; Mohlin, Erik
• 署名单位: Sodertorn University; Lund University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.009
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 82-97
• 关键词: Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies; Iterated admissibility; Payoff monotonicity; Convex monotonicity; evolutionary dynamics; Replicator dynamic

摘要

This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.