Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Lehrer, Ehud
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.003
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 163-194
• 关键词: Discounted repeated games; Observable payoffs; private monitoring; Information matrix; Sequential equilibrium

摘要

We consider a two-player discounted repeated game with private monitoring and free communication. We analyze two related types of information structures. In the first, each player observes a random signal that contains his own payoff with a positive probability. In this model we show how to support a rich set of payoffs as sequential equilibrium outcomes. In the second model the players observe only their own payoffs and a signal indicating whether the opponent observed his own. In this model the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs is characterized. The characterization uses an adaptation of Blackwell's partial order over information structures. When adapted to the framework of repeated games, this order draws a clear line between detectable and undetectable deviations, thereby enabling the characterization of equilibrium payoffs. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.