Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roberti, Paolo
• 署名单位: University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.009
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 497-514
• 关键词: Voting; lobbying; Citizen-candidate

摘要

This paper analyzes a model of electoral competition with uncertainty on the policy implemented by candidates. I show that this uncertainty can induce risk-averse voters to elect politicians whose policies are biased. I apply these results to a lobbying game, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies once elected. I show that voters elect politicians who implement policies biased in favor of the lobby. Increasing the probability of non-pandering candidates can increase the effect of lobbying. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large effects of lobbying on policy. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.