Competition for talent when firms' mission matters

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barigozzi, Francesca; Burani, Nadia
• 署名单位: University of Bologna; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.012
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 128-151
• 关键词: Multi-principals; bidimensional asymmetric information; skills; Intrinsic motivation; For-profit vs non-profit organizations; wage differential

摘要

We study optimal non-linear contracts offered by a non-profit and a for-profit firm competing to attract workers, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Motivated workers are keen to be hired by the non-profit firm because they adhere to its mission. Workers with different ability self-select into firms depending on which organization holds a competitive advantage. This determines the sign and the composition of the wage differential between firms, which encompasses labor donations induced by motivation and the selection effect of ability. Our model thus rationalizes the mixed empirical evidence concerning for-profit vs non-profit wage differentials. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.