-
作者：Metzger, Lars Peter; Rieger, Marc Oliver
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology; Universitat Trier
摘要：We investigate a framework for non-cooperative games in normal form where players have behavioral preferences following Prospect Theory (PT) or Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). On theoretical grounds CPT is usually considered to be the superior model, since it normally does not violate first order stochastic dominance in lottery choices. We find, however, that CPT when applied to games may select purely dominated strategies, while PT does not. For both models we also characterize the cases wh...
-
作者：Nunez, Matias; Pivato, Marcus
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We propose a new solution to the problem of strategic voting for large electorates. For any deterministic voting rule, we design a stochastic rule that asymptotically approximates it in the following sense: for a sufficiently large population of voters, the stochastic voting rule (i) incentivizes every voter to reveal her true preferences and (ii) produces the same outcome as the deterministic rule, with arbitrarily high probability. We then apply these results to obtain an implementation in B...
-
作者：Plott, Charles; Roll, Richard; Seo, Han; Zhao, Hao
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：The tick size in a financial market is the minimum allowable difference between ask and bid prices. By the rules of each exchange, no transactions can occur within the tick interval. The impact of tick size is an ongoing controversy which we study by experimental methods, whose simplicity helps distinguish among competing models of complex real-world securities markets. We observe patterns predicted by a matching (cooperative game) model. Because a price grid interferes with a competitive equi...
-
作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Buckenmaier, Johannes
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Approval voting allows voters to support as many candidates as they wish. One advantage is that voters have weak or no incentives to vote insincerely. However, the exact meaning of this statement depends on how the voters' preferences over candidates are extended to sets. We show that, under a combination of standard, well-established assumptions on extended preferences, voters always have a strongly sincere best response (a best response ballot such that every approved candidate is strictly p...
-
作者：Oechssler, Joerg; Rau, Hannes; Roomets, Alex
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Franklin & Marshall College
摘要：We ran experiments that gave subjects a straight-forward and simple opportunity to hedge away ambiguity in an Ellsberg-style experiment. Subjects had to make bets on the combined outcomes of a fair coin and a draw from an ambiguous urn. By modifying the timing of the draw, coin flip, and decision, we are able to test the reversal-of-order axiom. Our main result is that the reversal-of-order axiom seems to hold. We also confirm low levels of ambiguity hedging despite the relative obviousness of...
-
作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We study whether the basic tenets of the theory of zero-sum games are still valid when players are uncertainty averse. We focus on games with one-sided information, in which the uninformed player is uncertain about the state of nature. Uncertainty aversion turns the underlying zero-sum game into a many-player, non-zero-sum game. We show that the uninformed player has a unique equilibrium payoff. We provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium payoff vector. (C) 2019 Elsevier In...
-
作者：Rosato, Antonio; Tymula, Agnieszka A.
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Sydney
摘要：A key prediction of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion in second-price auctions with private values is that the number of bidders should affect bids in auctions for real objects but not in auctions with induced monetary values. In order to test this distinctive comparative statics prediction, we develop an experiment where subjects bid in multiple auctions for real objects as well as auctions with induced values, each time facing a different number of rivals. ...
-
作者：Valizadeh, Mehrdad; Gohari, Amin
作者单位：Sharif University of Technology
摘要：We study zero-sum repeated games in which the maximizer (player or team) is restricted to strategies with limited randomness. Particularly, we analyze the maxmin payoff of the maximizer in two models: the first model forces the maximizer to randomize her actions just by conditioning them to the outcomes of an observed random source. In the second model, the maximizer is a team of players who are free to privately randomize their corresponding actions but do not have access to any explicit sour...
-
作者：Abbink, Klaus; Dogan, Gonul
作者单位：Monash University; University of Cologne
摘要：We introduce the experimental mobbing game. Each player in a group has the option to nominate one of the other players or to nominate no one. If the same person is nominated by all other players, he loses his payoff and the mob gains. We conduct three sets of experiments to study the effects of monetary gains, fear of being mobbed, and different types of focality. In the repeated mobbing game, we find that subjects frequently coordinate on selecting a victim, even for modest gains. Higher gain...
-
作者：Polonio, Luca; Coricelli, Giorgio
作者单位：University of Trento; University of Southern California
摘要：We use eye-tracking to identify possible causes of inconsistency between choices and beliefs in games. Participants play a series of two-player 3 x 3 one-shot games (choice task) and state their beliefs about which actions they expect their counterpart to play (belief elicitation task). We use a model-based clustering method to group participants according to the pattern of visual analysis they use to make their decisions in the two tasks. We find that heterogeneity in the lookup patterns refl...
