The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Minozzi, William; Woon, Jonathan
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 144-162
• 关键词: Strategic information transmission; Sender-receiver games; multiple senders; laboratory experiment

摘要

We experimentally investigate the effect of a second opinion on information transmission. Our design varies the number of senders as well as the alignment and magnitude of senders' biases in a sequential, cheap-talk, sender-receiver game. We find that decision makers do no better when a second opinion is available, irrespective of the alignment or competition between advisers, than when they receive a single opinion. Despite the fact that messaging behavior differs across experimental conditions, receivers successfully extract the same amount of information-an amount greater than what is theoretically predicted. These findings are consistent with senders using a simple strategy of naive exaggeration, with receivers correctly recognizing this and adjusting their behavior accordingly. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.