Rationalizable choice functions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yang, Yi-You
• 署名单位: Aletheia University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.003
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 120-126
• 关键词: choice function; rationalizability; revealed preference; path independence; substitutability; stable matching

摘要

We study choice functions which arise in the context of matching with contracts. A choice function is rationalizable if it coincides with a choice function induced by a preference relation over sets of contracts. We show that a choice function is rationalizable if and only if it satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP), and give an algorithm for verifying the rationalizability of a given choice function. Consequently, we prove that every path independent choice function is rationalizable. This implies that under the substitutability assumption, the rationalizability condition and the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition are equivalent. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.