On non-monotonic strategic reasoning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Catonini, Emiliano
• 署名单位: HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.004
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 209-224
• 关键词: Strong Rationalizability; Strong-Delta-Rationalizability; Path restrictions; Epistemic priority; Order independence; backward induction

摘要

Strong-Delta-Rationalizability introduces first-order belief restrictions in the analysis of forward induction reasoning. Without actual restrictions, it coincides with Strong Rationalizability (Battigalli, 2003; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003). These solution concepts are based on the notion of strong belief (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). The non-monotonicity of strong belief implies that the predictions of Strong-Delta-Rationalizability can be inconsistent with Strong Rationalizability. I show that Strong-Delta-Rationalizability refines Strong Rationalizability in terms of outcomes when the restrictions correspond to belief in a distribution over terminal nodes. Moreover, under such restrictions, the epistemic priority between rationality and belief restrictions is irrelevant for the predicted outcomes. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.