Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction: A theoretical and experimental investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kirchkamp, Oliver; Mill, Wladislaw
• 署名单位: Friedrich Schiller University of Jena; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.003
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 616-635
• 关键词: auction; Overbidding; Spite; RISK; experiment

摘要

We use an experiment to compare a theory of risk-aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay auction. Both risk and spite are used to rationalize deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium bids. We exploit that equilibrium predictions in the second-price all-pay auctions for spite are different than those for risk-aversion. We find that spite is a convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not only can spite rationalize observed bids, also our measure for spite is consistent with observed bids. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.